Are There Limits to Free Speech? by Singer, Peter
 
 
University of Zanjan 
The Journal of  
Ethical Reflections 
Vol.1, Issue 4, Winter 2020-2021, pp. 43-56. 
Online ISSN: 2717-1159 / Print ISSN: 2676-4810 
http://jer.znu.ac.ir 
Are There Limits to Free Speech? 1  
Peter Singer  




Freedom of speech has traditionally been a cause championed by the left and 
liberal side of the political spectrum, against conservatives who have tried to 
limit the expression of radical ideas. Here are three examples from the United 
States: 
1) When I was appointed to Princeton University in 1999, Steve Forbes, whose 
father had endowed the university’s Forbes College, called for my appointment to 
be rescinded, and pledged that he would not donate to the university as long as I 
was on the faculty. Forbes was, at the time, running for the Republican nomination 
for president.  
2) In 2014 the University of Illinois withdrew an offer of appointment to 
Professor Steven Salaita because he posted tweets that were highly critical of Israel 
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and Prime Minister Netanyahu.  
3) In September 2017 Harvard’s Kennedy School withdrew Chelsea Manning’s 
appointment as a visiting fellow after then CIA Director [and later Secretary of 
State] Mike Pompeo called her a “traitor” and cancelled a lecture he had been 
scheduled to give at the school.  
At present, however, and in contrast to this tradition, in many parts of the world 
today, today the most vigorous opposition to freedom of speech comes from a 
section of the left. Here again are three recent examples from the United States, all 
of which occurred in 2017: 
1) At Middlebury College, in Vermont, protesters shouted down Charles 
Murray, co-author of the controversial book The Bell Curve, about race and IQ, and 
his host, Allison Stanger, a professor of international politics and economics at the 
college, suffered whiplash injuries and concussion after being pushed and jostled 
as she and Murray were leaving.  
2) At Berkeley, a planned event featuring the alt-right journalist Milo 
Yiannopolis was cancelled after violent protests.  
3) Outside the universities, James Damore, a software engineer at Google, was 
fired after he circulated a memo suggesting that there are differences between men 
and women that may explain, in part, why there are fewer women than men in his 
field of work.  
Some will argue that although the restrictions of freedom of speech by the right 
are indefensible, those by the left are intended to protect disadvantaged, threatened 
or marginalized groups and so are justifiable. Should we agree that some speakers 
cross a line, and should not be tolerated?  
*** 
In discussing that question, I begin with a disclosure: I have myself been 
thought to cross the line, and to express views that should not be tolerated. In 
a chapter of my book Practical Ethics, first published in English in 1979, I 
discuss the ethics of treating severely disabled newborn infants. I had become 
aware that in several countries, including the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Australia, medical staff in neonatal intensive care units sometimes 
suggest to parents that the prognosis for their child is so poor that they should 
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consider withdrawing life-support, with the death of the baby the near-certain 
outcome. Although this seems to me better than using all available medical 
techniques to prolong life, irrespective of the consequences for the child and 
the family, the death of the child is more drawn-out, and often less humane, 
than death from active euthanasia would be. This makes the situation difficult 
for the parents and the nursing staff, as well as the child. It would be better, I 
argue, to allow parents faced with a life and death choice for their severely 
disabled infant, to choose active euthanasia.  
Practical Ethics has been translated into several languages, and a German 
translation was published by Reclam in 1984. In 1989 I received and accepted an 
invitation to speak at a European Symposium on "Bioengineering, Ethics, and 
Mental Disability," organized jointly by Lebenshilfe, the organization for parents of 
intellectually disabled infants, and the Bishop Bekkers Institute, a Dutch 
organization in the same field. In addition, since I was going to be in Germany, I 
also accepted an invitation from Professor Christoph Anstötz, professor of special 
education at the University of Dortmund, to give a lecture on the subject "Do 
severely disabled newborn infants have a right to life?" At the time of accepting 
these invitations, although I was used to people having vigorous disagreements 
with my views about the treatment of disabled infants, as they did with my views 
about abortion and eating meat, none of my many speaking appearances had been 
protested against, nor had anyone ever tried to prevent me speaking.  
Shortly before I arrived in Germany, both invitations were withdrawn, as a 
result of protests by people who thought that the question of whether severely 
disabled infants have a right to life is not one that should be discussed. Christoph 
Anstötz, I should say, wanted to go ahead with the lecture he had invited me to give, 
but was overruled by the Rector of the university, who was clearly intimidated by 
the threat of protests. There was also extensive media coverage of my views, 
generally extremely derogatory and misleading. 
 It was then that I received an invitation from Professor Georg Meggle, at the 
University of Saarbrücken, to speak about my views there. I knew nothing of Georg 
then, but I could see that it took courage, in that atmosphere, to invite me to speak, 
and I was pleased to have an opportunity to explain my views to a university 
audience. Even that was not easy, because the room was filled with people who 
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wanted to shout me down and deny me the opportunity to speak. Meggle invited 
one of them up on the stage to state why I should not be allowed to speak. Georg 
handled the situation with great aplomb, first inviting one of the protesters onto the 
stage to explain why she thought I should not be allowed to speak, and then saying 
that it was only fair that I should be allowed to respond to the views that had just 
been put – not to give my original speech, but to reply. Many of the protesters, who 
had thought they were coming to object to some kind of extreme right-winger or 
even neo-Nazi were evidently surprised to find that I am politically on the left, that 
I had written a book called Animal Liberation, and above all that I am of Jewish 
descent and my parents were fortunate to be able to flee Austria after the Nazis 
arrived in 1938. In the course of my response, and then further questions and 
discussion from the audience, I managed to say almost everything that I would have 
said if I had been allowed to give my lecture. 
The protests did not end there. For several years thereafter, in Germany, 
Austria and the German-speaking part of Switzerland, announcements of my 
lectures led to protests and threats of violence. Such threats caused the complete 
cancellation of two entire conferences and the withdrawal, at late notice, of several 
invitations to speak at universities and conferences. In Zurich, I had to stop 
lecturing after I was physically attacked on the stage, and my glasses were ripped 
off my face and smashed under the boot of a protester.2   
Many of my German opponents were not interested in the reasons why a 
professor of philosophy might argue for making the option of euthanasia available 
to parents of severely disabled infants. Rather they held that, irrespective of the 
merits of the arguments, it is impermissible to question the inviolability of human 
life in general or the right to life of disabled human beings in particular.3 Some 
values, they claimed, are so sacrosanct that they must not be challenged. 
The legitimacy of objections to freedom of speech, similar in type to these 
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objection to my views urged by German opponents of freedom of speech is 
discussed by John Stuart Mill in his famous defense of freedom of expression in On 
Liberty. Mill begins his defense by arguing that to prohibit disagreement with a 
widely shared view is to assume infallibility in the belief that the view is true. He 
cites many examples to show that what has been believed to be the most certain 
truth has often turned out to be false. It is only by allowing views to be contested 
that we can really be justified in claiming to know that they are true. Moreover, he 
adds, even if a view is true, to prevent it being challenged is to risk it becoming dead 
dogma, rather than a living truth. 
Mill also considers a different ground for suppressing dissent. There are some, 
he tells us, who would deny the right to challenge a belief, not because they are 
certain the belief is true, but because the belief is “indispensable to well-being” and 
“none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs.” Mill responds 
that this objection seeks to separate the usefulness, or otherwise, of a view from the 
question of its truth. But surely, Mill says, we are no more infallible in assuming 
that a view is harmful than we are in assuming it to be false. We have to be able to 
discuss whether a view really is useful or harmful (Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 2).  
This is exactly what my German opponents were arguing – that my views, 
whether true or false, are dangerous. Germany’s past, they claimed, shows the 
danger of regarding some human lives as more valuable or “worthy of life” than 
others. But as Georg pointed out in Saarbrücken, if this claim is made, we should 
be able to discuss whether it is true. In response, I argued, no reflective society with 
sophisticated and expensive medical technology can avoid raising the issues that 
my opponents thought should not be raised. We can surely all agree that the fact 
that we can save a life does not imply that we ought to save that life. We need to ask 
whether our medical technology should always be used to preserve human life to 
the maximum extent possible. If the answer is “maybe not”, and it is acknowledged 
that sometimes the patient is incapable of expressing a preference for continuing 
to live or for dying, then some important questions must be asked: 
• On what grounds are decisions to discontinue treatment to be based? 
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• Should these grounds include judgments about the quality of the life that the 
patient can be expected to live, if he or she receives all possible treatment and, as a 
result, continues to live?  
• Who should make such a decision, when the patient cannot?  
• If the decision is to bring about the patient’s death, does it make a morally 
significant difference whether that is done by the withdrawal of life-support, such as 
a ventilator, or by a lethal injection?  
There is room for different views on these questions. I have no problem with 
that. My problem is in understanding how some people can believe that these 
questions should not be asked. 
On one point here my experience does not entirely support what Mill writes. He 
asserts: “And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the 
utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The 
truth of an opinion is part of its utility.” That is no doubt correct, if we are concerned 
with opinions about something that can be true or false. But, arguably, that is not 
the case with moral opinions. My German opponents seemed divided on this 
question. Some of them were conservative Christians, who thought that the sanctity 
of human life is God’s law and hence a moral truth that I was denying. To this group 
Mill’s point would apply. Others, however, were from the left, and regarded 
morality and politics as simply a power struggle. They saw themselves as on the 
side of the oppressed, whereas my views were part of a capitalist-fascist attempt to 
eliminate all who are not productive workers. It was precisely because they saw 
ethics as relative to economic interests that they rejected the idea of debate and 
discussion as a way of reaching truth. They represent a different kind of challenge 
to free speech, one that sees ethics as mere camouflage for the real issues of power 
and dominance that, they say, inevitably lie beneath its surface.  
This approach was not entirely unknown when Mill wrote On Liberty – it is 
outlined in The Communist Manifesto and can be traced back to Thrasymachus, who 
in Plato’s Republic defines “justice” as “whatever is in the interests of the stronger”–
but it has become more popular since, especially among postmodernists, 
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deconstructionists, and critical theorists of various kinds.4 It is alien to Mill’s 
philosophical outlook, however, and so requires a separate refutation. That 
refutation should start from the fact that those who oppose freedom of expression 
without assuming that reason plays a role in ethical argument face the problem of 
undermining their own ethical stance. They cannot, consistently argue that it is true, 
or any better justified, in terms of reason and argument, than the view they would 
suppress. Once that is granted, however, we have arrived at an argumentative 
stalemate, and opened the door for those willing to use force to impose what we 
might call the Thrasymachus solution: to impose their own “justice” which in fact 
becomes “whatever is in the interests of the stronger.” In other words, they have 
opened the door for, precisely, fascism. There is a deep irony in having one’s freedom 
of speech suppressed by those who profess to be anti-fascist. 
*** 
In arguing against those who tried to prevent me speaking, I have been focusing 
on views that I believe to be sound or true. What about views that are palpably 
false? Even here it is important to defend the right to free speech. As an 
example, I will take David Irving, whose failed lawsuit against the historian 
Deborah Lipstadt is the subject of the 2016 film Denial. In 2006, Irving served 
time in an Austrian prison for saying that the Holocaust never happened. 
The best way to persuade anyone of the reality of the Holocaust is to confront 
them and their audience with some of the evidence, which is completely 
overwhelming. In contrast, how is imprisoning someone who denies the existence 
of the Holocaust going to persuade anyone that the Holocaust happened? Would it 
be unreasonable to think that if a government locks someone up for saying 
something, that person may be in possession of facts that the government wants to 
keep secret? 
But, it may be said, to deny the existence of the Holocaust is deeply offensive to 
those who survived it, or to the descendants of those who were victims of it. It is. I 
know because I am among those descendants: three of my four grandparents died 
in the Holocaust, and the fourth endured terrible years in the overcrowded and 
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disease-ridden Theresienstadt ghetto before her liberation. Nevertheless, I agree 
with Mill that causing offence is not sufficient reason for restricting free speech. 
There are so many different ways in which people can take offence that to restrict 
freedom of expression on this ground would destroy it. The benefits of freedom of 
speech outweigh the harms of offense.  
This is especially true in philosophy. Our tradition goes back to Socrates. The 
Oracle of Delphi said that he was the wisest person alive. That puzzled him, until 
he realized that if he was wiser than others, it was because others thought that they 
knew things, and he knew that he did not. Socrates spend a lot of time 
demonstrating to his fellow-Athenians how little they knew, and pushing them to 
examine the way they were living. In doing so, he would undoubtedly have offended 
many of them. For this he was condemned to death by drinking hemlock. Today, 
philosophers are still challenging conventional beliefs and our values, encouraging 
us to ask ourselves how we ought to to live, and in the process changing the lives of 
many people. To do this properly, philosophy needs a license to cause offense.  
Nevertheless, aren’t there limits on freedom of speech? Mill thought that there 
are: “even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are 
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some 
mischievous act.” That sentence immediately precedes his oft-quoted distinction 
between publishing in a newspaper one’s opinion that corn dealers starve the poor, 
and saying the same to an excited mob in front of a corn-dealer’s house (Mill, On 
Liberty, Chapter 3).  
Today we are less worried about violence to corn dealers, and more concerned 
about incitement to racial or religious hatred.  
Consistently with the distinction Mill was trying to draw, I believe that the right 
of free speech does not extend to a right to incite racial or religious hatred, or hatred 
against people because of their sexual orientation. Such vilification, sometimes 
referred to as hate speech can be distinguished from other forms of speech because 
it is an appeal to our emotions, rather than to our intellect or our finer feelings, and 
often, it is an incitement to violence. Granted, the line is not always easy to draw, and 
where it is not, that will be a task for the courts. But the principle is tolerably clear.  
It is also clear that some speakers and authors who have recently been shouted 
down are not engaging in vilification. Charles Murray’s claims about race and 
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intelligence in The Bell Curve do not amount to racial vilification, for they are aimed 
at our intellect. Murray presents complex evidence and makes arguments based on 
that evidence. You may think the evidence is selective and the arguments unsound. 
You may point out that some will find his conclusions offensive. Even if all that is 
true, it is not sufficient grounds for preventing Murray from defending those 
claims. The proper response is to refute the evidence, or present contrary evidence, 
and to point to holes in the argument. For those who are predisposed to believe the 
conclusions Murray reaches, preventing him speaking will only reinforce their view 
that his opponents have no answer to him. If Murray’s opponents can refute him, 
his supporters will say, why would they need to prevent him speaking? Especially 
if he has been invited to speak in a university, it would seem, where there are many 
people who have the resources and ability to scrutinize and point out whatever 
flaws there are to be found in his writings, refutation would seem a more effective 
way of discrediting his claims than preventing him putting those claims forward. 
 At Middlebury College after the 2017 events involving Murray, a number of 
faculty members wrote and signed onto a statement of principles under the heading 
“Free Inquiry on Campus.” The principles included such points as: 
• Genuine higher learning is possible only where free, reasoned, and civil speech 
and discussion are respected. 
• Only through the contest of clashing viewpoints do we have any hope of replacing 
mere opinion with knowledge. 
• The incivility and coarseness that characterize so much of American politics and 
culture cannot justify a response of incivility and coarseness on the college campus. 
• A protest that prevents campus speakers from communicating with their audience 
is a coercive act. 
The statement prompted a counter-statement by a group of Middlebury 
students entitled “Broken Inquiry on Campus.” The counter-statement critiques 
some of the principles included in the statement by members of the faculty. It offers 
us an opportunity to examine the thinking of some of those who prevented Murray 
from communicating with those who had turned up to hear him. Here is one 
revealing passage, written in response to the faculty assertion that “Only through the 
contest of clashing viewpoints do we have any hope of replacing mere opinion with 
knowledge.” 
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The students respond: 
By elevating bigotry and engaging with it in open debate under the 
misguided view that all ideas must be respected, we risk elevating biased 
opinions with no solid, factual foundation into the realm of “knowledge” 
and affirming the unconscious biases many hold… If we hold that the 
contest of clashing viewpoints is the only way to solidify knowledge, it 
naturally follows that we have a responsibility to articulate some 
parameters for which viewpoints are worthy of such a process. 
  The students assume that Murray’s work consists of biased opinions with no 
solid, factual foundations. But that is precisely what needs to be demonstrated, and 
by silencing Murray and preventing any debate, they missed the opportunity to 
demonstrate it. Perhaps, instead of pressing their university administration to 
cancel Murray’s visit, they should have asked for a debate in which Murray and 
someone knowledgeable in the area who is opposed to his views – and there are 
many such people – would have had the opportunity to show that his views do lack 
solid factual foundations.  
The students also appear to believe that it is possible to articulate parameters 
for deciding which viewpoints are worthy to enter the contest of clashing opinions. 
Presumably, since Murray’s work attempts to appeal to our reason rather than to 
our emotions, the students believe that these parameters can be set on the basis of 
an assessment of the content of the work, rather than, as I have suggested, its tone. 
But how is that to be done, without debating and discussing that content? And why 
do the students think that they are in a position to decide this for others – for those 
who had come to the event to hear what Murray had to say, and, presumably, to 
hear other members of the university community respond critically to it? If they 
simply assert that they know that Murray is wrong, Mill’s assumption of infallibility 
is squarely applicable. 
The students do have more to say on this matter, but it cuts directly against 
what I have been arguing are key values for a university and for any community 
that values an open search for knowledge: 
We contend that experiences and emotions are valid ways to see the 
world, and that the hegemony of rational thought-based perspective 
often found in a university setting limits our collective creativity, 
health, and potential. If we are to move from opinion to knowledge, it 
is truly imperative to listen, understand, and reflect upon the various 
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lenses members of our community use to view the world. 
It is, of course, important to know how other members of our community view 
the world, and that includes knowing what they are experiencing and what 
emotions they are feeling. But we should firmly reject the claim that emotions are 
“valid ways to see the world” and we should uphold what is here referred to, 
critically, as “the hegemony of rational thought”. Otherwise, we open the door to all 
the nationalist, racist and sexist emotions which as we saw only too clearly in the 
2016 US presidential election, are very widely held in that country, and which 
continue to be regularly expressed by Donald Trump. I am sure the students would 
not regard his emotional and biased tweets as “valid ways to see the world.” But 
without rational thought, how can we decide which emotions are valid ways of 
seeing the world, and which are not? 
I need to respond to one ground that the students give for disrupting Murray’s 
speech, rather than presenting arguments against his views. They ask: “…is it 
reasonable for students or community members to be asked to debate someone 
who has presented their intellectual inferiority as an irrefutable fact?” The 
reference, of course, is to Murray’s claim that there is a genetic basis for the lower 
average IQ scores of African Americans, when compared to whites. I am not aware 
of any place in which Murray has presented this as “an irrefutable fact”. I presume 
that he would acknowledge the possibility of new evidence emerging that would 
refute his views. More importantly, he is talking about averages, not about the 
intellectual inferiority of any particular African Americans – it is of course obvious, 
and Murray states it clearly, that some African Americans are intellectually superior 
to most whites. Nevertheless, it is doubtless troubling for African Americans, and 
indeed for anyone hoping for a more egalitarian and less racially divided society, to 
hear claims that there are genetic differences in intelligence that align in any way 
with racial differences. Is this a reason for not allowing such claims to be discussed 
in a university? 
In 2017, the same year that Charles Murray was prevented from speaking at 
Middlebury College, Yale University named a new residential college after a very 
different Murray – Pauli Murray. Born in 1910, Pauli Murray was the 
granddaughter of a slave. She became a civil rights activist. She spent time in jail 
for refusing to sit in the “Negro” section of the bus. She led sit-ins to desegregate 
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white-only eating places in Washington DC. When she studied law at Howard 
University, in the 1940s, she was the only woman in the class. Her professors 
were all male. One of them announced to the class that he didn’t know why a 
woman would want to study law. She graduated first in her class and applied to 
Harvard Law School to do graduate work, only to be turned down because at 
that time Harvard Law School did not admit women. She did her own legal 
research on segregation, which was later drawn upon by the legal team that won 
the landmark desegregation case, Brown v Board of Education. Later Pauli 
Murray was a co-founder, with Betty Friedan, of the National Organization for 
Women. 
In 1963 Pauli Murray was studying for a doctorate at Yale Law School when the 
Yale Political Union invited George Wallace, the Governor of Alabama, to speak on 
campus. In his inaugural speech as Governor, Wallace had called for “Segregation 
now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever!” In the wake of that speech, 
members of the Ku Klux Klan bombed a church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing 
four African American schoolgirls and injuring 22 others. Many blamed Wallace 
for inciting violence. By that time, opposing segregation had been Pauli Murray’s 
life work for more than 20 years. She had described segregation as “a monster, 
dividing peoples, thwarting personalities, breeding civil wars.” She said that she 
would picket any event at which Wallace spoke. Nevertheless, she wrote to the 
president of Yale urging him not to “compromise the tradition of freedom of speech 
and academic inquiry” by preventing Wallace speaking on campus. Her experience 
in the civil rights movement had given her a strong sense of the importance of 
maintaining these rights for everyone. In her letter to the president of Yale, she 
wrote: “This has been the principle behind the enforcement of the rights of the 
Little Rock Nine, James Meredith and others to attend desegregated schools in the 
face of a hostile community and threats of violence. It must operate equally in the 
case of Governor Wallace.” 5   
Pauli Murray was an African American woman living in a climate of racism and 
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sexism more overt than anything that exists today, and she was fully aware of how 
mistaken and harmful racist and sexist views are. Yet this did not lead her to seek 
to suppress them, nor did it blind her to the fundamental importance of freedom of 
thought and expression. She sets an example to us all.  
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